Tor Browser Shadowsocks
Tor Browser VS Shadowsocks – compare differences & reviews?
Tor is free software for enabling anonymous communication.
A fast tunnel proxy that helps you bypass firewalls
Tor Browser How to Use & Download Tor to Access the Dark Web
0-100% (relative to Tor Browser and Shadowsocks)
These are some of the external sources and on-site user reviews we’ve used to compare Tor Browser and Shadowsocks
Tor Browser Reviews
The best ad blockers in 2020
On the desktop, you can grab a version of Tor Browser for Windows, macOS or Linux. There’s also a version of Tor Browser for Android, which replaces the previous OrBot + OrFox combination recommended for browsing Tor on Android.
10 Alternative Browsers Based on Mozilla Firefox
That’s why the Tor browser exists. It’s a fork of Firefox, but the source code has actually been modified to make it more secure.
Social recommendations and mentions
Based on our record, Tor Browser
should be more popular than Shadowsocks.
It has been mentiond 5 times since March 2021.
We are tracking product recommendations and mentions on Reddit, HackerNews and some other platforms.
They can help you identify which product is more popular and what people think of it.
Tor Browser mentions (5)
Tor Browser 11. 0 Alpha 9 Crack 2022
gives you the Tor Browser, for free, with nothing locked behind a license.
– Source: Reddit
5 days ago
The Issue most Tor Hidden Service scammers miss and forget to fix.
First download Tor (DM u/DrDeath47 for an alt links to download tor if you’re blocked from accessing The tor project page).
15 days ago
Tor runs slowere and slower then cancels
Whatever you have is not a current version of Tor Browser or tor. is where you should get Tor Browser from.
5 months ago
Is it secure to access onion sites using a random browser alongside Orbot VPN?
It’ll probably have the encryption and authentication properties of onions so secure in that sense yes. But also, Tor Browser is available for Android.
6 months ago
Shadowsocks mentions (2)
School I go to blocks websites on the byod wifi. I have tried Openvpn and LT2P hosted on and RPI, both of which are successfully blocked (props to them for being smart). Please help
Maybe try Wireguard and SSH tunnelling but both of these can be blocked by enterprise firewalls. I’d give something like Shadowsocks a bash and see.
4 months ago
QUIC is now RFC 9000
2) Even if you use other bonding mode that can spread the flows over several network interfaces, you’ll get low throughput due to the aforementioned reordering and also due to the congestion control, more on that below. Bonding works well when you have several “equal” links, which is not the case with LTE, where the speed may be quite different across the links and also vary with time. Last but far from least,…
– Source: Hacker News
What are some alternatives?
When comparing Tor Browser and Shadowsocks, you can also consider the following products
– The Tor Project’s free software protects your privacy online. Site blocked? Email [mailto:[email protected]] for help downloading Tor Browser.
– Psiphon is circumvention software for Windows and Mobile platforms that
provides uncensored access to Internet content. Read more about Psiphon.
– OpenVPN – The Open Source VPN
– ProtonVPN is a security focused FREE VPN service, developed by CERN and MIT scientists. Use the web anonymously, unblock websites & encrypt your connection.
– Windscribe is a desktop application and browser extension that work together to block ads and trackers, restore access to blocked content and help you safeguard your privacy online.
– Fast and secure, ad and tracker blocking browser.
Share your experience with using Tor Browser and Shadowsocks.
For example, how are they different and which one is better?
Post a review
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Challenges, priorities, and progress in anti-censorship …
This blog post seeks to bring clarity to the modus operandi of the Tor Project in the anti-censorship space by providing a summary of the challenges we face, the priorities we focus on, and the progress we have made so far related to our circumvention technology. Censorship circumvention is a complex and ever evolving problem, and this blog post summarizes our approach in tackling it. Please feel free to ask any related question in the comments. Thanks to hanneloresx’s translation, you can find a Chinese version of this blog post below.
Tor’s Anti-Censorship space
In February 2019, we hired two engineers to focus on and advance anti-censorship technology at Tor. The anti-censorship team also includes several other people in the Tor community who contribute designs, code, insight into past work, infrastructure, documentation, and resources. The goal of Tor’s anti-censorship team is to understand network censorship and build technology to circumvent it so that the Tor network can be accessible to everyone.
The state of circumvention
Some Internet Service Providers (ISP) block the domain, making it difficult for their users to download a copy of Tor Browser. Our service GetTor can help these users get Tor Browser despite this: simply send an email to, which will automatically respond with alternative download links for Tor Browser. These download links point to GitHub, GitLab, the Internet Archive, and Google Drive. At least one of these hosting providers should be accessible to each of our users. For example, users from China can download Tor Browser from our GitHub mirror.
Once you have your copy of Tor Browser, you are ready to connect to the Tor network. Unfortunately, some ISPs interfere yet again, aided by technology that either blocks the IP addresses of Tor relays and/or detects the Tor protocol dynamically, by inspecting network traffic that passes the ISP’s perimeter—so-called deep packet inspection (DPI).
If you are unable to directly connect to the Tor network, you need to use bridges. Bridges are unlisted Tor relays and, depending on the bridge type, can obfuscate network traffic in a way that’s more difficult for ISPs to detect. The simplest method of censorship circumvention in Tor Browser is to use our default bridges—a set of a dozen bridges that are part of Tor Browser. These bridges are essentially public, which is why more effective censorship systems such as China’s Great Firewall (GFW) block them, but they are still effective in many places like Iran. Take a look at our Tor Browser manual to learn how to enable default bridges.
If you are unable to connect to our default bridges, you currently have three options:
Use an obfs4 bridge. You can request obfs4 bridges in three ways: directly in Tor Browser, by visiting, or by sending an email to More technical users can set up their own obfs4 bridge. Unfortunately, many of the bridges you obtain this way may not work in China. We are currently implementing a social bridge distribution system called Salmon, which will make it significantly harder for the GFW to block obfs4 bridges. More on that below.
Use Snowflake. Snowflake is currently only available in our Tor Browser alpha version but is on track to be part of Tor Browser stable. Our most recent changes added a new set of STUN servers, making Snowflake available in China and other places that block access to Google services. We are currently stress testing the system to handle more users as we move towards a stable release.
Use meek-azure. While meek-azure should work everywhere (including behind the GFW), it is overloaded and therefore slow. Microsoft’s Azure CDN (which meek-azure is based on) is expensive, which is why we have to place a traffic cap on the meek-azure bridge.
What are our challenges?
A successful circumvention system consists of two components:
a network protocol (for example WebRTC, obfs4, or TLS) and
an endpoint to connect to (for example a Snowflake proxy, a CDN server for meek, or an obfs4 bridge).
Both the protocol and the endpoint must resist detection. The GFW is able to detect the obfs2 and obfs3 protocol on the wire, meaning that it can detect these protocols by simply looking at the bytes that cross the national perimeter. The latest iteration in the obfs series, obfs4, still currently works in China in the sense that the GFW cannot (or chooses not to) block it by simply looking at bytes on the wire. Unfortunately, obfs4 being unblocked is not enough. One also needs an unblocked endpoint to connect, and this is where the trouble starts. We currently use the service BridgeDB to hand out bridges to our users. After the user solves a CAPTCHA, BridgeDB will return up to three bridges. CAPTCHAs are not the only defense to prevent censors from learning all bridges since in the age of deep learning, CAPTCHAs represent but a small obstacle. Handing out bridges to users while preventing censors from learning them all remains a hard problem, but more on that later. Fortunately, most censoring countries are limited in the amount of time, money, and talent that they can dedicate to blocking the Tor network, which is why BridgeDB is still effective in many places.
We are limited in the amount of time and money that we can dedicate to circumvention technology, which means that we are unable to address all problems that we want (and should) address; as a result, we need to think carefully about how we can best spend the limited time we have. Consider, for example, that there are numerous trivial fixes that could make Tor available again in places like China. Unfortunately, censors can often react just as swiftly and block Tor yet again, rendering such fixes a poor investment of our time. The key is to develop technology that is asymmetrically more difficult for a censor to block. A promising circumvention technology is one that takes us n hours to deploy and 2^n hours for a censor to block. Needless to say, it’s not always clear which technology would work best in advance of deployment, which is why we seek to maximize our impact with limited resources by formulating and focusing on clear priorities, as explained below.
What are our priorities?
Our goal is to maximize the number of people that we help circumvent Internet censorship around the world. Internet censorship is a moving target, which means that technologies that worked great five years ago find themselves blocked by many ISPs today. This is why we need to constantly invest in new research and technology to be ahead of censors.
Over the last year or so, we invested heavily in Snowflake, which originally started as a research project. Over the next few months, we aim to land Snowflake in the stable Tor Browser version, marking a significant milestone. We have been slowly ramping up its use and now have over 6, 000 volunteer proxies helping users circumvent censorship and providing moving targets that are difficult for censors to enumerate and block.
BridgeDB, our existing bridge distribution system, is showing its age. It’s heavily tailored towards a specific purpose, making it difficult to extend and generalize. We therefore started working on a more flexible and lightweight reimplementation. This reimplementation will provide the following benefits over the old BridgeDB:
Implement a feedback loop that hands out bridges to censorship measurement platforms such as OONI and feeds the resulting reachability information back into bridge distribution. That means that if a user from country X requests a bridge, we won’t give them a bridge that’s known to be blocked in country X.
Our reimplementation will periodically test bridges with the help of bridgestrap so that we won’t be handing out bridges whose obfs4 port is firewalled, or that are otherwise broken.
We are working on building the Salmon bridge distribution system, which will help with the problem of endpoint blocking. Salmon was originally proposed in a research paper at PETS’17. The idea is that users have a “reputation score” that goes down when one of their bridges is blocked and it goes up if their assigned bridges remain unblocked. If a user’s reputation score gets too low, the user gets blocked, and if it gets high enough, the user can invite others to the system. Take a look at this net4people thread for a crisp overview of Salmon.
We have a roadmap that we revisit every three months to identify a handful of short-term goals. Take a look at our roadmap to see these goals.
How can you learn more or get involved?
Our lack of resources is our biggest challenge against powerful nation-state censors, so we are always looking for new contributors and collaborators. If you would like to learn more or get involved, take a look at the following:
Tor’s anti-censorship team meets once a week, on Thursdays at 16:00 UTC in the #tor-meeting IRC channel. Joining a weekly meeting is the best way to meet us and get started on the team. Don’t worry if you miss a meeting: we post our meeting logs to the tor-project mailing list. Most of us are also available in the #tor-dev and the #tor-project IRC channels on, so feel free to reach out any time. Every two weeks, we typically have a reading group right after our regular meeting. We use these reading groups to discuss research papers or software projects. Take a look at our meeting pad to learn what our next reading group is going to be about and feel free to join our discussion.
All of our software lives in the anti-censorship GitLab project. If you’re interested in getting involved, take a look at issues that have the “First Contribution” label.
Finally, here is a list of past blog posts and presentations that provide more information:
Philipp’s Internet Measurement Village 2020 talk on “Circumventing Internet censorship with Tor”.
Roger’s DEF CON 27 talk on “The Tor Censorship Arms Race: the Next Chapter”.
A 2014 blog post on “How to read our China usage graphs”.
A 2019 mailing list post on “Next steps for unclassifiable protocols”.
在2019年2月份，我们聘请了两名工程师，专注于推进Tor的规避审查技术。我们的团队还包括Tor社区的其他一些成员，他们贡献了系统设计、代码、基础设施、说明文档 、对于已有系统的见解、和其他资源。 Tor规避审查团队的目标是了解网络审查制度，并及开拓技术来规避这些制度，让每个人都可以使用Tor网络。
一些互联网服务提供商(ISP)屏蔽了域名得其用户很难下载Tor浏览器。在这种情况下，我们的服务GetTor 可以帮助这些用户获得Tor浏览器： 用户只需发送电子邮件到, 它将自动回复一些Tor浏览器的代替下载链接。这些代替下载链接分别指向GitHub、GitLab、Internet Archive、和Google Drive。 每个用户应该至少可以访问其中一个主机提供商。例如， 来自中国的用户可以从我们的GitHub镜像下载Tor浏览器。
使用 obfs4 网桥。 您可以通过三种方式获取 obfs4网桥：直接在Tor浏览器中请求，访问, 或者发送电子邮件到 。更熟悉技术的用户可以 建立自己的obfs4网桥。不幸的是，许多通过这种方式获得的网桥可能无法在中国使用。我们目前正在 实施一个称为Salmon的社会化网桥分配系统，这将大大增加GFW封杀obfs4网桥的难度。 以下有更多对Salmon的介绍。
使用meek-azure。 虽然meek-azure理论上应该在任何地方都可以使用（包括在GFW以内），但它已超载运行，所以速度很慢。微软的Azure CDN（meek-azure是基于Azure CDN的）价格比较贵，所以我们必须在meek-azure网桥上设置流量上限。
这两个部分，协议和端点都必须能够抵御检测。GFW能够检测线路上的obfs2和obfs3协议，也就是说，它可以通过简单地观察跨越国家边界的字节来检测这些协议。obfs系列的最新迭代–obfs4, 目前在中国在某种意义上仍然可以使用, 就是说GFW不能（或者说选择不） 仅仅通过观察线路上的字节来阻断它。不幸的是，obfs4没有被屏蔽是不够的。我们还需要一个未被屏蔽的端点来连接，这就是问题的开始。目前我们使用BridgeDB服务来给用户发布网桥。 在用户解决了验证码之后，BridgeDB会返回最多三个网桥。验证码并不是防止审查员获取大量网桥的唯一防线，因为在深度学习时代，验证码只是一个小小的障碍。在向用户发布网桥的同时防止审查员获取大量网桥仍是一个科技难点，但我们以后再深度聊这个话题。 幸运的是，大多数审查国家所能够投入封锁Tor网络的时间、金钱和人才都是有限的，所以BridgeDB在很多地方依然有效。
我们团队的时间和资金是有限的，这意味着我们无法解决我们想要（和应该）解决的所有问题；因此，我们需要仔细考虑如何最好地利用我们有限的时间。比如，我们可以做很多琐细的修复和措施使Tor在例如中国的地域再次使用。但是，审查人员往往能迅速做出反应， 并再次封锁Tor，这使得盲目的修复很不划算。我们的关键是要创作使审查难度比开发难度大的非对称性技术。一个有前途的规避技术是，我们需要n个小时来部署，而审查员需要2^n个小时来阻止。毋庸置疑，在部署之前，我们不可能总清楚哪种技术最有效， 所以我们要通过明确的策划，以有限的资源发挥出最大的影响，如下文所述。
包含Salmon网桥发布系统，这将有助于解决端点屏蔽的问题。Salmon源于PETS’17的一篇研究论文。在Salmon系统里，每个用户有个“信誉分数“。当一个用户的网桥被屏蔽时，这个用户的信誉分数会下降， 而如果一个用户的网桥一直都没有被屏蔽，这个用户的信誉分数会上升。如果一个用户的信誉分数太低用户就会被封，而如果一个用户的信誉分数够高，用户就可以邀请其他人加入系统。 这篇net4people帖子对Salmon有很s清晰的概述。我们正在构建Salmon网桥发布系统。
Tor的规避审查团队每周开一次会，每周四下午16:00UTC，在#tor-meeting IRC频道。参加会议是认识我们或加入团队的最好方式。如果您错过了一次会议也不用担心： 我们会将会议记录发布到tor-project邮件列表。我们大多数人也经常在的#tor-dev和#tor-project IRC频道上，可以随时联系我们。 每两周，我们通常会在会议后举行一次阅读小组。 我们用这些阅读小组来讨论研究论文或软件项目。请看一下我们的会议记事本以了解我们下一个阅读小组的内容。欢迎您参入我们的讨论。
我们的代码在anti-censorship GitLab项目中。如果您有兴趣参与， 可以看看那些带有”First Contribution”标签的问题。
Roger在DEF CON 27的演讲《Tor与审查的军备竞赛：下一章》
How to use Tor Browser via V2Ray | Yaodo Blog
I have talked about How to Use Tor Browser Via Shadowsocks before, actually there are few differences between using Tor through these two proxy methods.
For me, due to the Chinese Great Firewall,
if I want to use tor browser, a proxy method is necessary.
And for security and anonymous, you can use
proxy though not blocked by some disturbing firewall.
1 Download Tor Browser
2 Open Tor Browser
3. 1 Click on “Configure”
3. 2 Tick “I use a proxy connect to the
3. 3 Find your IP address and port of the proxy
There are two ways:
1) Open V2RayN and click on “Parameter Settings – Core Basic Settings”. You can see the IP and ports. You must disable “Open Traffic Sniffing”
2) Open the configuration file of
V2RayCore, which is usually located in the root directory of the V2Ray folder.
The file name is “”. In “inbounds”, you can also see the IP and
port. Similarly, you must change Sniffing’s Enable value to false.
3. 4 Fill in proxy IP and port in Tor
4 Click “Connect” to connect to Tor Network
5 You can visit to check the results
Frequently Asked Questions about tor browser shadowsocks
Can I be tracked with Tor browser?
While Tor provides a much higher level of anonymity than a regular web browser, it’s not 100% secure. Your location will be hidden and your traffic can’t be tracked, but certain people can still see your browsing activity – at least part of it.
Do I need a VPN if I use Tor?
Plus, the first Tor node that you connect to can see your real IP address. A VPN isn’t a requirement to use Tor, but it helps a lot. It encrypts your whole traffic, masking it from the ISP. In short, it’s much safer to use Tor with a VPN.Sep 2, 2021
Can you use a VPN and Tor together?
Although in many ways very different, both VPN and the Tor anonymity network use encrypted proxy connections in order to hide users’ identities they can be used together. Using a VPN and Tor together can provide an extra layer of security and mitigate some drawbacks of using either technology exclusively.May 27, 2021